Ecosystems, often perceived as functioning entities with specific roles, are in reality more complex and less purposeful than commonly believed. The concept of 'function' in ecology, derived from human needs and goals, can lead to misunderstandings and potentially harmful actions. The author argues that ecosystems do not inherently have functions they can fail to perform; rather, these functions are assigned by humans based on their values and priorities. The notion of an ecosystem 'malfunctioning' is thus a human construct, reflecting our values and objectives rather than an intrinsic property of the ecosystem itself.
The author delves into the philosophical underpinnings of 'function' in biology, contrasting two theories: causal role theory and selected effects theory. Causal role theory, which focuses on the contribution of components to the system's capacity, is criticized for its inability to distinguish genuine functions from incidental effects and to explain malfunctions. In contrast, selected effects theory, grounded in evolutionary history, provides a standard against which success or failure can be measured. However, the author emphasizes that ecosystems, as open and dynamic systems, do not have selected effects or intrinsic purposes.
The use of 'function' in ecology, particularly in the context of 'ecosystem services', has been influential in policy and conservation efforts. However, the author warns against conflating ecological processes with human-centred goals. The metaphor of ecosystems as 'rivets' in an aeroplane wing, for instance, implies a purposeful configuration, which is not accurate for natural systems. The author suggests that 'malfunctions' in ecosystems should be understood in the context of human values and priorities, rather than as inherent properties of the ecosystem.
To move beyond teleology in ecological descriptions, the author proposes a shift towards characterizing ecosystem interactions and quantifying changes in state, without reference to purposes or goals. This approach respects the autonomy of non-human systems while acknowledging the influence of human values. The author concludes that environmental action should be guided by explicit moral responsibility, rather than by attempting to repair nature's perceived purposes.
